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GLOBAL SOCIAL FASCISM 
 
Violence, Law and Twenty-First Century Plunder1  
 
 







The intellectual authors of neoliberalism were aware of the lethal implications of what they 
advocated. For ‘the market’ to work, the state was to refuse protection to those unable to 
secure their subsistence, while dissidents were to be repressed.  What has received less 
attention is how deadly neoliberal reforms increasing come wrapped in social, legal and 
humanistic rhetoric.  We see this not only in ‘social’ and ‘legal’ rationales for tearing away 
safety nets in Europe’s former social democratic heartlands, but also in the ‘pro-poor’ 
emphasis of contemporary development discourse. This includes contexts where colonial 
legacies have facilitated extreme armed violence in service of corporate plunder. To expose 
these dynamics, I juxtapose the everyday violence of austerity in Britain with neoliberal 
restructuring in Colombia. The latter is instructive precisely because, in tandem with 
widespread state-backed terror, Colombia has held fast to the language and institutions of 
liberal democracy.  It has, as a result, prefigured the subtle authoritarian tendencies now 
increasingly prominent in European states. 
  
The reconceptualization of law, rights and social policy that has accompanied neoliberal 
globalization is deeply fascistic. Authoritarian state power is harnessed to the power of 
transnational capital, often accompanied by nationalistic and racist ideologies that legitimize 
refusal of protection and repression, enabling spiraling inequality.  Nevertheless, extending 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos’s discussion of ‘social fascism’, I suggest that widespread 
appeal to the ‘social’ benefits and ‘legal necessity’ of lethal economic policies marks a 
significant and Orwellian shift.  Not only are democratic forces suppressed: the very 
meanings of democracy, rights, law and ethics are being reshaped, drastically inhibiting 
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Perseus wore a magic cap so that the monsters he hunted down might 
not see him.  We draw the cap down over our eyes and ears so to deny 
that there are any monsters. 
 







June 2017. I am writing in the British Library in London. I came here to finish a book on 
corporate plunder in Colombia, but I feel I should leave and join the demonstration taking 
place a couple of miles away in Westminster. In the small hours of Thursday morning, a fire 
began in Grenfell Tower, a high-rise tower block housing more than six hundred people. 
Within hours, the entire building was in flames. Official figures put the death toll at six… 
thirty… fifty-eight… seventy-nine. They say many of those killed will be undocumented 
migrants and illegal sub-tenants who have simply ‘disappeared’ after the blaze.  
 
The Grenfell catastrophe had long been foreseen by campaigners. It was the predictable 
consequence of years of disinvestment in social housing. The building had been covered in 
cheap, flammable cladding to prevent an eyesore for wealthier inhabitants of the Royal 
Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. Residents had been complaining for years about the 
absence of fire extinguishers. They had repeatedly raised concerns about the use of hazardous 
materials.2 Cuts to legal aid had meant that they were unable to afford advice from lawyers. 
Instead, the building’s tenant management organisation threatened campaigners with legal 
action for questioning fire safety.3 In 2016, the government voted against legislation 
demanding that landlords make properties ‘fit for human habitation’.4 ‘Red tape’ isn’t good 
for profit. Campaigners are demanding an inquest. The government wants an inquiry that 
may take years.5  
 
Commentators spout disbelief that these things are happening in Britain, in 2017. ‘Are we 
being thrown back to the levels of inequality characteristic of Victorian England?’, they ask 
repeatedly. In the nineteenth century, those without the means to secure their lives were 
expected to meet an early and unnatural death, be it in factories and slums, or cast off to die 
in the poorhouse. In The Condition of the Working Class in England, Friedrich Engels coined 
the term ‘social murder’ to describe these routine and systematic deaths for which no 
individual could be held accountable.6  Just days after I wrote this, Labour Shadow 
Chancellor John McDonnell evoked Engels to describe the Grenfell deaths as ‘social 
murder’. He was denounced, not only by the Right, but by much of the so-called ‘Left’.7 
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Today, the mythology of progress diverts attention from the more than million destitute 
people in the UK who go without food, toiletries and even beds, or the ten thousand disabled 
people who have died after being assessed as ‘fit to work’ following recent welfare reforms.8  
 
The expressions of disbelief in the face of the Grenfell tragedy are indicative of a refusal to 
recognise what has long been apparent in the Global South: that capitalism kills as a matter of 
routine. The residents of Grenfell knew it when they campaigned against the neglect of their 
building.9 The placards and signs near the blackened ruins of the tower grasp the truth: 
‘Corporate Murder’, ‘People’s Lives Don’t Matter Under Capitalism’.10 Especially if you are 
situated on the wrong side of the colour line, racialized as black or brown, undocumented, 
non-citizen or not-quite-citizen. Especially if you are female. Especially if you are sick or 
disabled and thus unable to work to sustain your existence.11  
 
In Colombia, ‘corporate murder’ is a familiar concept. Colonial history has facilitated direct 
assassinations and massacres of those threatening corporate interests.  Nevertheless, as I soon 
learnt when I began working with Colombian trade union, peasant and indigenous 
organisations more than a decade ago: if we are to contend with the deeper dynamics of 
capitalist violence, we must grapple with forms of harm and violence that go under the guise 
of normality and ‘business as usual’.12 This is Engels’ ‘social murder’: the routine, merely-
technical, legalised atrocities that masquerade beneath the legal myths of freedom of contract, 
corporate personhood and the pursuit of ‘efficiency’. The results of Colombia’s ‘economic 
opening’ in the 1990s followed a pattern already familiar across the post-colonial world as a 
result of neoliberal reforms forced upon forced upon governments by the IMF and World 
Bank as a condition of aid from the 1980s.13 They include numerous phenomena that have, in 
practice, meant largescale premature death: expulsion of peasants from previously common 
land; denial of access to social insurance as a result of the privatisation of public services; 
lay-offs; unemployment and deteriorating labour conditions, alongside increasingly 
authoritarian government. 
 
Since the 2008 financial crisis, Britain has been in the grip of ‘austerity’, a euphemism for 
drastic cuts to state social provision on the supposed basis that private consumption and 
investment will ‘stimulate ‘the economy’.  The intensification of neoliberal policies that 
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entrench and exacerbate social inequality and the attacks on the social safety nets once 
designed to protect people have had profoundly violent consequences.14 Corporate and 
political elites have vastly increased their wealth. They have benefitted from generous tax 
cuts for corporations and the wealthy, alongside the incremental transfer of lucrative 
contracts for running once-public services.15 Meanwhile, as Vickie Cooper and David Whyte 
underscore in their recent edited volume, The Violence of Austerity, the ‘people most affected 
by austerity cuts are not only struggling under the financial strain but are becoming ill, 
physically and emotionally, and many are dying’.16 
 
The intellectual authors of neoliberalism were aware of the lethal implications of what they 
advocated. They knew that it meant stripping all protection from those who could not secure 
their own subsistence, alongside repression of those who stood in the way.17 By the turn of 
this century, the effects of neoliberalism in practice were sufficiently pronounced that socio-
legal scholar Boaventura de Sousa Santos was highlighting a worldwide crisis in the modern 
idea of a social contract between state and citizens.18 Citizenship rights have been usurped by 
a host of private contracts between the users and providers of once-public services, or the 
contracts between companies and precarious employees or sub-contracted workers. Even in 
once social democratic Europe, responsibility for welfare is increasingly passed from 
governments to individuals, while neoliberal governments have become increasingly 
authoritarian.19 
 
What has received less attention is the extent to which lethal economic policies have been 
accompanied by social, legal and humanistic rhetoric. As Ian Bruff notes in his important 
work on authoritarian neoliberalism ‘“[l]eft” politics has frequently been guilty of taking the 
law and the ‘social’ institutions within capitalism to be somehow neutral, ignoring in the 
process how “non-market” social forms have often been central to, not resistant against, the 
rise of neoliberalism’.20 Deadly decisions are passed off as mere technical fixes by appeal to 
social necessity and the rule of law.  It is only by considering the life-denying and life-
promoting faces of policy together that we can begin to grasp their deadly synergy.  This is 
what I seek to do by juxtaposing Britain and Colombia. 
 
This juxtaposition may sound counter-intuitive and I certainly do not seek to underplay the 
profound differences between these two contexts. Colonial legacies shape patterns of 
violence and exclusion in North and South in very different ways. From the time of the 
Conquest, colonised peoples, conceived as ‘savage races’ or as slaves ‘by nature’, could be 
sacrificed to European economic interests and the ideology of modernity.21  The racism and 
economic power relations that the Conquest installed continue to shape contemporary plunder 
                                                      
14
 Cooper and Whyte, ‘Introduction’, 3. 
15
 Ibid., 18-19. 
16
 Ibid, 2. 
17
 Warren Montag, ‘War and the Market: The Place of the Global South in the Origins of Neo-liberalism’, The 
Global South 3:1 (2009), 126-138. 
18
 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Towards a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization and Emancipation 
(London: Butterworth LexisNexis, 2002), 456ff. 
19
 Ian Bruff, Neoliberalism and authoritarianism’, in Simon Springer, Kean Birch & Julie MacLeavy (eds), 
Handbook of Neoliberalism. Routledge: New York, 2016. 
20
 Ibid. 115.  
21
 See, inter alia, Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Books, 1963; Enrique Dussel, The 
Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor and the Philosophy of Liberation, translated and edited by 
Enrique Mendietta. Humanity Books, 1996; Julia Suárez-Krabbe, Race, Rights and Rebels. London: Rowman 
and Littlefield International, 2015. 




of territories and resources.  For instance, the expansion of the extractive-export model 
through mineral extraction and large-scale agribusiness has visited multiple forms of violence 
upon indigenous peoples, peasants and populations of African descent in Latin America, who 
are displaced from their territories, cut off from their ties to the land, forced into precarious 
buy-sell agreements with corporations or left sick, poisoned, hungry or thirsty to the point of 
death. The impunity with which this takes place evokes the old colonial principle of terra 
nullius: these lands are occupied by unpeoples, empty of anyone who counts as human.22 
Nevertheless, the juxtaposition is illuminating precisely because, despite these differences, 
both Britain and Colombia illustrate Santos’ point about a crisis in ideas of a social contract 
driven by neoliberalism. Both countries shed light upon the contradictions between the 
formal recognition of citizenship rights and the crafting of a legal regime that undermines 
those rights. Indeed, Colombia typifies these dynamics to such an extent Santos himself has 
referred to the country as ‘the reverse of modernity’s social contract’.23 
 
Intersections of law and violence in Colombia are instructive precisely because of the extent 
to which the country has held fast to the language and institutions of liberal democracy. 
Democracy has not been so blatantly sacrificed to the demands of capitalism as it was in the 
Southern Cone dictatorships of previous decades. It is not simply that democratic forces are 
suppressed. Democracy is hollowed-out and trivialised, placing drastic restrictions on the 
possibility of challenging corporate power. It is, as a result, ‘no longer necessary, or even 
convenient, to sacrifice [formal] democracy in order to promote capitalism’.24 Here, 
Colombia is an extreme example, rather than a special case. Even in Europe, neoliberal states 
have become increasingly authoritarian. Rights are stripped away and devastating political 
decisions are insulated from democratic influence. Meanwhile, supposed means of promoting 
people’s welfare are reformulated as instruments of stealth corporate murder. 
 
The theorists of today’s economic orthodoxy anticipated a role for law along these lines, as 
well the authoritarian reconfiguration of state power it implied. The crisis in the idea of a 
social contract is underpinned by a specific vision of ‘rule of law’ that has nothing to do with 
the rights of citizenship and everything to do with property rights and the protection of 
private contracts.  What is striking about the current juncture, however, is the extent to which 
authoritarianism is disguised by the redefinition of law as a ‘neutral’, merely ‘technical’ 
means of securing prosperity for all.  As we shall see, both the World Bank/IMF recipes for 
‘good governance’ and present prescriptions for austerity in Europe have been based upon 
supposedly ‘neutral’ legal obligations. Appealing to law sounds softer and more liberal than 
appealing to economic necessity, but it masks the differences between highly divergent 
notions of law.  By declaring themselves subject to ‘the law’, governments may protect the 
fundamental rights of their citizens, but they may just as easily entrench the tyranny of 
systemic violence. 
This appeal to legality is a counterpart of the increasingly social and humanitarian rhetoric 
through which deadly economic policies are authorised. At the extreme end of this, even 
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massacres and forced displacement in the service of corporate plunder in Colombia have been 
accompanied by a discourse of development, conservation and rights perpetuated by 
international and state institutions and NGOs. However, this logic, which Colombian authors 
Humberto Cárdenas and Álvaro Marín have denoted a logic of ‘defending life by sowing 
death’,25 is mirrored not only in the pro-poor discourse of the post-Washington development 
consensus but also in the ‘social’ rationales for tearing away social safety nets in Europe.  





Not all modes of corporate murder are the same.  In places more deeply marked by colonial 
histories, people are not simply abandoned to the point of death, but actively killed as a 
matter of routine. Colonial discipline often involved armed groups funded by extractive 
companies, as the then British diplomat and later Irish revolutionary, Roger Casement, 
documented in the Congo and Amazon of the 1800s.  In what is now the Putumayo region of 
Colombia, for instance, the extraction of rubber was accompanied by the shooting and 
mutilation of ‘inefficient’ enslaved rubber collectors.26 
 
Similar dynamics continued in Colombia after independence. The ‘massacre of the banana 
workers’, commemorated in Gabriel García Márquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude, is an 
infamous case in point. In 1928, long before left-wing guerrilla groups were formed and 
counter-insurgency became the rationale for repression of protest, the Colombian army killed 
around 1,000 striking banana workers. The United States had threatened to invade with 
Marine Corps if action was not taken to protect the interests of the United Fruit Company.  
By the mid twentieth century, anti-communism had reached a ‘genocidal pitch’.27 Left-wing 
insurgencies were formed amidst the repression, and from the 1960s, Colombia’s enthusiastic 
adoption of US counter-insurgency recommendations saw armed civilians routinely 
incorporated into military strategy.  By the second part of the following decade, a ‘dirty war’ 
was being waged against rural populations by state forces and paramilitaries, with the aim of 
eliminating insurgents’ potential supporters.28  Larger paramilitary groups were subsequently 
trained by the Colombian armed forces, with the support of US military aid, businesspeople 
and drug-traffickers.  These paramilitaries went on to perpetrate over 12,800 political killings 
over the course of the 1980s.29  By the end of that decade, massacres were commonplace.30 
 
Colombia’s ‘economic opening’ in the early 1990s set the scene for an upsurge of corporate-
backed armed violence. Successive governments adopted and entrenched neoliberal 
economic policies, in pursuit of foreign direct investment in natural resource extraction, 
alongside ‘flexible’ and ‘competitive’ labour markets. Massacres and selective killings at the 
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hands of paramilitary death squads were central to this process.  Right-wing paramilitaries 
had been so closely integrated into official military strategy, with the support of ongoing US 
military aid, that they became known as the ‘sixth division’ of the Colombian army.31 As 
workers were stripped of hard-won rights, trade unionists were subject to repression so 
widespread and brutal that historian Renan Vega coined the term ‘sindicalicidio’ - or trade 
union genocide – to make sense of it.32 Chainsaws in hand,  paramilitaries began to take over 
entire regions from the mid-1990s. Those deemed subversive or surplus to requirements were 
displaced or ‘disappeared’.  Landholdings were concentrated and an authoritarian social order 
imposed.  Afterwards, state institutions would add a veneer of legality to the process.33 
 
In this way, vast swathes of Colombia’s national territory were handed over to transnational 
corporate interests.  Numerous companies have been directly implicated in massacres and 
selective killings. The contemporary incarnation of the United Fruit Company, Chiquita 
Brands, even admitted having paid 1.7 million US dollars to state-linked paramilitaries in the 
Urabá region of Colombia between 1997 and 2004, as well as to supplying paramilitaries 
with weapons. According to Colombia’s Attorney General, these payments led to the murder 
of 4000 civilians in the banana region of Colombia, as well as contributing to the expansion 
of paramilitary groups throughout the country.34  In 1999, seventeen civilians were killed 
when the village of Santo Domingo in the neighbouring Department of Arauca was bombed.  
Compelling evidence suggests not only that the bombing was planned by Occidental 
Petroleum and the Colombian Air Force in the company’s offices, but that aerial surveillance 
for the mission was carried out by US security contractor Airscan, using a Skymaster plane 
supplied by the oil company. Witnesses were later killed by paramilitaries.35 
 
In 2002, a friend of mine, Gilberto Torres, was kidnapped in a van belonging to BP’s oil 
pipeline company, Ocensa. His activities as a leader of the Oilworkers Union (USO) had 
made him – as he puts it -  a ‘thorn in the company’s side’.  Torres was tortured and held for 
forty-two days.  As a result of a high-profile campaign for his release, he became one of only 
two trade unionists to survive abduction by paramilitaries. In a trial in Colombia, Torres’ 
kidnappers said they took direct orders from Ocensa and that the company had paid them an 
extra forty thousand US dollars for the job.36 BP has also been implicated in the deaths of 
numerous peasant activists in the area around its Colombian oilfields. Torres’ kidnapping 
came just a few years after an international media outcry over BP’s links with the Colombian 
army and private security contractor Defence Systems Limited.37   
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Between 1994 and 2002, eight unionised Coca-Cola workers were killed by paramilitaries. 
Four of them were workers at the same bottling plant, in the north-western city of Carepa, 
Urabá. After three leaders of the Colombian Foodworkers’ Union38 had been killed in the run 
up to negotiations with the Carepa bottling plant management, paramilitaries killed the local 
branch’s General Secretary, set fire to the union’s offices and then assembled workers and 
told them that if they did not resign from the union they would be killed.  Witnesses said the 
resignation letters were prepared on company computers and collected by plant 
management.39 In 2002, Adolfo Múnera, a leader of the same union, was shot dead after his 
return to Barranquilla on the Caribbean coast, after having spent some time in exile following 
his role in a successful strike.  There was abundant evidence of collusion between bottling 
plant management, state forces and paramilitaries in bringing about Múnera’s murder. 
Months later, paramilitaries publicly announced plans to kill more members of the union 
because they were interfering with Coca-Cola’s business.40  
 
Fourteen members of the Colombian Foodworkers’ Union working at Nestlé have also been 
killed.41 I accompanied the union in April 2006, during negotiations with Nestlé in 
Bugalagrande, southwestern Colombia. Before the negotiations had even begun, negotiating 
committee members reported being followed by cars with blacked out windows. One of the 
union members I got to know during that visit was Oscar López. In 2013, López was shot 
dead during a hunger strike. The day before his murder, several union activists had received 
text messages from a paramilitary group, threatening them with their deaths for ‘bothering 
Nestlé’.42 
 
In the wake of horrors such as these, our gaze is automatically directed to acts most clearly 
recognizable as violence: those direct acts carried out by identifiable agents. Yet it is clear to 
the victims themselves that the violence penetrates far deeper.  On their online list of twenty-
nine members killed since the union was founded, the Foodworkers’ include Guillermo 
Gómez, whose desperation at the closure of the Coca-Cola bottling plant where he worked 
led him to take his own life in 1998. Also listed is Walter Rengifo, who died from a brain 
aneurism ‘caused by the constant repression, persecution and permanent labour conflicts’ 
with Nestlé.43 Selective assassinations are just one part of a continuum of ways in which 
capitalism authorises death – through hunger, inhuman living and working conditions and the 
precarity that generates the ‘total crisis’ Gómez described in his suicide note. The union 
denounce ‘inhuman’ labour conditions on Coca-Cola bottling plants that would not sound 
unfamiliar to the approximately one million workers on casual, ‘zero hours’ contracts in 
Britain today. Workers labour from five in the morning until eleven or twelve at night for 
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wages that barely cover the cost of food and rent.  They undertake long and exhausting treks 
into work because deregulated housing ‘markets’ have pushed the cost of local 
accommodation beyond workers’ reach. Extensive sub-contracting means most have to cover 
the costs of their own tools and uniforms, healthcare and social security.44  In the union’s 
discourse, these violences too are crimes against humanity.  So is the widespread hunger 
generated by a food and agriculture industry designed for corporate profit rather than the 
wellbeing of the population.45 
 
For precarious workers, the unemployed and those participating in the informal economy, the 
cost of comprehensive health insurance is prohibitive. Public hospitals are limited in number, 
drastically under-resourced and medical care is out of the reach of many rural populations.46 
In September 2006, I spent a week with the Foodworkers’ Union in Barranquilla, where 
members of the National Association of Hospital and Clinic Workers (ANTHOC) talked 
about further violences visited upon the population by the denial of treatment, and the 
transformation of healthcare from a right into a business.47  I was invited to visit a public 
hospital, where patients in many wards were two to a bed. ANTHOC too had experienced 
high levels of armed repression for their activism in defence of public healthcare. Yet it was 
the systematic violence at work the plunder of public services that my companion wanted to 
talk about. He took me to the morgue and explained how the young man whose body was 
lying there would have been saved had the hospital had the basic resuscitation equipment 
available to those who could afford health insurance.48 
 
I thought of his words again, recently, when I read that researchers have attributed thirty 
thousand ‘excess deaths’ to healthcare cuts in England over the course of 2015 alone.49 Two 
decades of stealth National Health Service privatisation is now reaching a peak under the 
Conservative government.50 The result has been rationing of treatment for critically ill 
patients, suspension of ‘non-urgent’ surgery and assorted other proposals entailing denial of 
care.51 By the beginning of 2017, the Red Cross was proclaiming the National Health Service 
in a state of ‘humanitarian crisis’.52 
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From the slow deaths of workers through sickness and exhaustion, deaths from hunger or the 
denial of healthcare, to the tragedy of Grenfell Tower, premature death is a normal, 
predictable and often entirely legal outcome of the capitalist organization of production and 
exchange. Reading Marx through a lens of violence and visibility, Amedeo Policante has 
suggested that, from the preface to the first German edition of Capital, Marx framed his 
endeavour as an effort to uncover the quotidian, slow-grinding, systemic violence at work 
beneath the ‘civil peace’ of nineteenth-century liberal society. ‘[B]ehind the comfortable 
darkness of our induced blindness, there dwell the monsters. And these are real monsters, 
endowed with a body and the capacity to mutilate and destroy, which cannot be dispelled by 
reason alone’.53  For all the horror of land dispossession, for all the brutality of laws that 
criminalized the dispossessed, for all the ‘extirpation, enslavement, and entombment in 
mines’ of colonized peoples, there is another, less spectacular form of horror inherent within 
capitalism: the constant sucking of life from the working class, ‘the vampire thirst for the 
living blood of labour’.54  
 
In his ‘sideways reflections’ on violence, Slavoj Žižek cautions us ‘to disentangle ourselves 
from the fascinating lure’ of the immediately visible sort of violence carried out by 
identifiable agents, such as members of the security forces or police.  We must step back to 
perceive what lies behind it: the real, but unseen ‘objective violence’ that ‘sustains the very 
zero-level standard against which we perceive something as subjectively violent’. The 
violence engrained in societal structures and dominant ideologies is not visible as violence, 
because we take it for granted as ‘normal’. It is, in Žižek’s words, the ‘spontaneously 
accepted background’ against which we register more visible horrors, such as (legally 
defined) violations of human rights or acts of negligence where individuals can clearly be 
found to be at fault. As Marx indicates in the epigraph to this chapter, ‘we draw the cap down 




The myth of a neutral, natural civil order has generated a sort of cognitive dissonance on the 
part of liberal thinkers. As Marx himself observed, more than twenty years before he 
published Capital, the liberal principles of freedom and equality embody a completely 
different vision of humanity and completely different moral reference points to the capitalist 
order within which they are asserted.56 Liberal philosophers have – in different ways and to 
different degrees - tried to get around the problem by drawing distinctions between the 
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criteria for moral action and criteria for economic action.57 Adam Smith’s moral philosophy, 
for example, was worked out in perpetual tension with his political economy.  In The Wealth 
of Nations, Smith made clear that societies must not only exercise the right to kill in order to 
generate terror of punishment for crimes against property, but also that ‘the market … must 
necessarily at certain precise moments, “let die”’. Smith’s metaphor of the market’s ‘invisible 
hand’, which steers the natural order of things in accordance with providence, was an attempt 
to reconcile morality with a commercial society based upon selfishness and greed.  That some 
must be abandoned, even to death, is covertly set out by Smith as the basis of social 
harmony.58   
The intellectual authors of neoliberalism acknowledged implicitly that the free market ideal 
demanded ‘the courage to turn away from the imploring hand of famine or to strike it down if 
it should violate the laws of property and the rationality of the market’. (If only from time to 
time and only in relation to a minority of world’s population).59 Warren Montag has explored 
this at length in relation to the work of Ludwig Von Mises, who was clear that there could be 
no such thing as ‘an enforceable human right to subsistence’, nor even a right to existence. 
Whereas, for Marx, ‘the capitalist class was unfit to rule because it could not assure the 
existence of its own laborers; for Von Mises it is fit to rule only if it knows enough to refuse 
any such assurance on principle’.60  Respecting the natural laws of the market is the only way 
to secure the continuation of society itself, and market necessity demands that the right of 
private property always be granted priority over the right to subsistence. Thus, for von Mises, 
while charity is usually (but not always) harmless,  
those who cannot secure their own subsistence (or that of their children) have no 
enforceable claim on those who can, even if the latter have a surplus beyond what is 
“necessary” to their existence…. A right to existence, enforced by the state, through 
price and wage controls, housing subsidies, or at the extreme, the distribution of the 
necessaries of life, will undermine private property and distort market mechanisms to 
such a degree that the continuation of society itself is endangered.61 
Neoliberalism is often talked about as if it involved the ‘retreat’ of the state: a passive stance 
on the part of government. Von Mises, however, was candid that what was demanded was the 
active decision on the part of those in power to abandon those who cannot secure their own 
subsistence, even to the point of death.  And, while neoliberal ideology does not consider it 
legitimate for the state to actively kill those who lack access to food, housing or medicine, it 
requires willingness to use armed force to repress those who demand things be otherwise or 
try to take what is not theirs.62 Von Mises was also explicit that the same armed force of the 
state must be applied in the Global South where governments or populations ‘resist the 
freeing up and development of the natural wealth with which they merely co-exist and 
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therefore the natural necessity of the market out of fear of the destitution that such 
development brings’. Ideas of inviolable national sovereignty or the rights of indigenous 
peoples to collective territories are 'utterly without force or effect’ in the face of global 
economic necessity. No covenant or charter could have prevented the Conquest of the 
Americas. War and Conquest are the only alternatives to the freedom of foreign investment.63  
For Von Mises, as for classical political economists, the laws that govern social reality are 
indifferent to human conceptions of justice. Human rights and substantive ideas of justice 
have no place in any understanding of the market.64 
Even when legal rights are formally recognized, the ability to enforce these rights always 
depends upon the capacity to resolve the contradictions between formal rights and economic 
force. As David Whyte has highlighted in relation to deaths at work, law itself often 
undermines formal rights.  This role is accomplished in part by legal fictions such as 
workers’ ‘freedom’ of contract with employers on whom they depend for their very 
subsistence, or the corporate ‘person’ and associated ideas of employers’ limited liability for 
deaths and injury of employees.  Economic power is also persistently redefining the 
boundaries of law, creating a sort of state of exception in which formal rights can be lawfully 
violated. In the fast-disappearing social democracies of the West, regulatory agencies have 
tended to intervene more consistently in the face of these contradictions, rendering those who 
lack access to the means of securing their subsistence less exposed to the brutality of 
economic force than they are in the Global South. Yet the neoliberal assault on the welfare 
state has eroded of much of this regulation, as well as other forms of social protection like 
welfare benefits and comprehensive healthcare. In Britain, for example, the Health and Safety 
Executive made such drastic cuts that some local authorities no longer have any role in 
protecting or inspecting workplaces. As a result, death at work can occur with widespread 
corporate impunity.  Workers are completely exposed in the face of economic force.  They 
are excluded from the protection of law despite the existence of formal rights.65 
 
These contradictions between the formal recognition of rights and the laws given shape by 
economic force are not unique to the Global North. In much of the South, neoliberal policies 
demanding the sacrifice and suffering of those unable to secure their own subsistence have 
been accompanied, not only with a rhetorical emphasis on the ‘rule of law’, but also with an 
emphasis upon ‘rights’. Colombia is a pertinent case in point. The country’s ‘economic 
opening’ was marked, in 1991, by a new National Constitution, said to include a wider array 
of citizenship rights than any in the world, including an assortment of labour rights and the 
territorial rights of indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations.66 Enshrined within the 
constitution was the principle of the Social Rule of Law (Estado Social de Derecho), a legal 
order ‘with the citizen at the centre, and in which the social is the reason for the existence of 
political powers’.67 The Social Rule of Law came into force the same year that a military 
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intelligence reorganisation plan placed paramilitary death squads directly under the orders of 
the military high command.68  It was also accompanied by a series of legal reforms that 
precluded access to the rights formally recognised in the Constitution. 
 
Take labour law. The 1991 Constitution recognized a series of rights that, if made effective, 
would have made labour precarity impossible. It incorporated ILO conventions on freedom of 
association, the right to organize and collective bargaining.69  It also committed Congress to 
producing a labour statute that would protect minimum fundamental principles, such as 
stability of employment, social security and adequate rest for workers.70 In practice, however, 
the power of economic force to define legality makes access to these rights impossible. The 
Constitution came into force almost simultaneously with an array of laws designed to 
generate ‘flexible’ labour markets and attract foreign investment. For example, Law 10 of 
1989 created ‘associated work cooperatives’, through which former employees are forced to 
bid for contracts, covering the costs of their own materials and social security.  This was a 
policy promoted with the support of the World Bank as well as paramilitary organisations. It 
has become central to corporations’ cost reduction strategies.71  Subsequent laws have 
lengthened the working day, cut overtime payments, facilitated mass staff layoffs and 
generated extensive subcontracting of labour that obliterates the possibility of stable 
employment and social security.72 
 
The result has been working conditions such as those described by the leaders of the 
Foodworkers’ union in the case of Coca-Cola. Permanent, generally unionised employees 
were replaced by temps sub-contracted through agencies and by ad-hoc employment of the 
reserve army of former workers I met waiting outside bottling plant gates in hope of a few 
hours’ employment. Delivery lorries were handed over to ‘cooperatives’ composed primarily 
of former employees who became responsible for the maintenance of lorries and their own 
salaries. Those who were re-employed and new, casual workers, received wages that were 
approximately thirty-five percent less than those of workers on direct contracts, while the 
wages of those contracted through cooperatives were reduced by three quarters in real 
terms.73   
 
Economic force not only has the capacity to shape unconstitutional – and so effectively 
illegal – legislation. It is also able to act outside the law in the name of economic necessity.  
For example, the Ministry of Social Protection has repeatedly complied with bottling 
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companies’ requests to refuse to recognise local union committees. This is despite the 
Ministry’s lack of jurisdiction over trade unions’ internal affairs and despite Colombia’s 
ratification of international labour conventions that grant unions autonomy to decide their 
own rules and elect their own representatives.74 In 2003, when Coca-Cola FEMSA closed 
eleven out of sixteen Colombian bottling plants as part of the Coca-Cola Company’s drive to 
achieve a more ‘efficient’ global franchise system, the company simply ignored legislation 
barring companies from closing factories or branches without authorisation from the Ministry 
of Social Protection.  Over three thousand workers were laid off, with mass resignations 
achieved by forcibly detaining workers in the presence of armed security guards. The 
workers were blackmailed into resigning their contracts for financial compensation, under 
threat of otherwise being fired, and they were not allowed to leave until they had done so.75 
The Ministry, for its part, retrospectively authorised the closures, alongside the laying-off of 
those workers who had refused to resign.  Most of those laid off were forced into destitution.  
Many had worked for the company for over twenty years, in a context where new jobs for the 
over thirty-fives are almost unheard of (especially when that person has a history of being a 
union member). 
 
Similar dynamics exist around the Constitution’s recognition of territorial rights. These rights 
are likewise undermined by a combination of law and extra-legal action.  For example, 
Transitory Article 55 gave rise to Law 70 of 1993, intended to protect Afro-Colombian 
communities’ cultural and territorial rights.  These communities were given land on the 
Pacific Coast, but their attempts to return to land from which they had been displaced in the 
Inter-Andean valleys were rejected. This land was in the hands of Colombia’s oligarchic 
families who, like transnational corporations, have long benefitted from the ability to act 
outside the law when it suits them.  On top of that, other legislation – such as that granting 
concessions to mining companies - has undermined recognised territorial rights. Even the 
right to prior consultation in accordance with ILO Convention 169 on indigenous and tribal 
peoples has had limited effect.  The government draw a line between ‘prior consultation’ and 
the right of communities to veto projects on their lands.76 
 
In Colombia, this has been accompanied by exceptionally high levels of armed repression.  
Yet, here too, Colombia is a pronounced example rather than a special case. Neoliberal 
reforms worldwide have come with strengthened security apparatuses, authoritarian rule and 
the repression of resistance via exceptional measures that allow normal legality to be 
suspended in the name of emergency.  Legacies of colonialism have facilitated this in 
contexts such as Colombia or the Southern Cone dictatorships of the 1970s (praised by the 
World Bank as the forerunners of the structural adjustment programmes subsequently 
imposed across the Global South).77 However, authoritarian tendencies were also evident in 
Thatcher and Reagan’s deliberate exaggeration of the Soviet threat during the early days of 
neoliberal reforms in the US and UK, which facilitated the transfer of resources from welfare 
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to the repressive machinery of the state.78 Today, these tendencies are clearer still, even in the 
European heartlands of twentieth century social democracy. The 2008 financial crisis was 
met with a dramatic intensification of neoliberal reforms already underway. This went with 
escalating use of state and institutional power to undermine formal democratic rights, 
criminalisation of resistance and numerous illegal or quasi-legal provisions and restrictions to 
freedom of assembly and protest.  Mobilisations that would once have been considered 
essential to democracy have been framed as ‘extremist’ attacks on ‘democracy’ that demand 
a repressive response. 
 
In 2005, I was present at a protest at the University of Valle in Cali where police killed 
twenty-one-year-old chemistry student Jhonny Silva.  Protests had erupted across the country 
opposing the free trade agreement being negotiated between Colombia and the United States 
that week.  Earlier that day, residents of a poor neighbourhood had taken to the streets to 
protest privatisation and ongoing cuts to water and electricity. Riot police had deployed tear 
gas indiscriminately, leading to the death of a young child.  When the students went out to 
protest, the police drove them back inside the campus and spent the afternoon illegally firing 
stun grenades and teargas directly at protestors.  Later, as the protest drew to a close, the 
police illegally entered the campus and began firing teargas and live ammunition at students. 
Silva could not run as fast as the other students, having suffered polio as a child.  He was shot 
at point blank range and died on the way to hospital. Another student was seriously injured 
by a tear gas canister.  Two more were detained overnight, threatened with being 
‘disappeared’ and dismembered, then released the next morning without charge.79   
 
The day after Silva was killed, the British human rights delegation that I was part of met with 
the secretary of the governor of the administrative department of Valle del Cauca, Gladys 
Hernández, who justified the police’s actions on the basis of their duty to ‘protect public 
order’.  The same day, far right President Álvaro Uribe visited the city and proclaimed that 
the police and public authorities could count on his ‘instant authorisation to go in, finish off 
and lock up the violent people’ in the University.80  These events reflect a systematic 
criminalization of social protest in Colombia, which has been further intensified over recent 
years.81  In the context of the ongoing ‘dirty war’, members of the university community 
were already receiving frequent death threats.  In October 2006, twenty-nine-year-old Julián 
Hurtado, a member of the Truth Commission investigating the murder, was shot dead by 
sicarios (hired assassins) on his return home from an event commemorating the first 
anniversary of Silva’s death.82 
 
Despite the intensity of the violence in Colombia, there were similarities in the logic of 
repression to be found five years later in Britain, during the 2010 protests against spending 
cuts and university fees. I remembered Jhonny Silva when protestor Jody MacIntyre was 
dragged from his wheelchair by police. The mainstream media even implied this was an 
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appropriate response given McIntyre’s thought crime of holding ‘revolutionary’ views.83  The 
parallels were perhaps even more pronounced in the case of Alfie Meadows, who suffered 
life-threatening injuries after being hit on the head by a police baton the same year. The 
Metropolitan Police subsequently charged Meadows and fellow student Zak King with 
violent disorder. Meadows and King were acquitted in 2013 after a jury accepted that they 
had been attempting to defend themselves and fellow protesters.  Their acquittal highlighted 
the extent to which police had begun to make unlawful use of Section 2 of the 1986 Public 
Order Act, which defines the crime of violent disorder, in order to repress dissent.  Eighteen 
out of nineteen students charged with violent disorder during the tuition fees protests were 
likewise acquitted. Counsel for Zak King described the use of the Public Order Act as a 
‘sledgehammer’ against peaceful protestors that ‘failed to differentiate between the actions of 
a crowd and individuals within it’.84 
 
 
Illegal Rule of Law 
 
Authoritarianism and coercive repression are not just initial means to impose unpopular 
neoliberal policies. In Latin America and beyond, state terrorism has certainly made it easier 
for the ruling class to implement a ‘shock redistribution’ of resources in favour of the 
wealthy.85 Nevertheless, in both North and South, authoritarianism is ‘a permanent and 
necessary part of neoliberal ideology, institutionalization and practice’.86  Despite the myths 
of ‘market rule’ and the ‘rollback’ of the state, neoliberalism has never been about unfettered 
markets.  Even orthodox neoliberal dogma has never entertained doing away with the state or 
with legal regulation.87 We should not see authoritarianism simply as the exercise of brute 
coercive repression. Rather, ‘[a]uthoritarianism can also be observed in the reconfiguring of 
state and institutional power in an attempt to insulate certain policies and institutional 
practices from social and political dissent’.88 
At the heart of these processes has been an unfolding reconceptualisation of law as a 
supposedly neutral, technical tool of governance. Property rights are sacred and freedom of 
contract between private individuals sets the limit to state intervention and democratic 
contestation.  The result is that the rule of law is understood in highly authoritarian terms as a 
‘a universal minimal legal system, capable of harsh control of any individual threatening the 
bottom line of property rights and incapable of limiting corporate actors’.89 Yet this 
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authoritarianism is simultaneously disguised by the redefinition of law as a ‘neutral’, merely 
‘technical’ means of securing economic growth.  The significance of this conceptual shift 
cannot be understated.  It is no coincidence that neoliberal globalisation took off at the time 
this understanding of law rose to dominance in the United States. Previously, the World Bank 
and IMF had been prohibited from intervening in countries’ legal systems because of their 
own bylaws, which prohibited political intervention. Redefining law as non-political allowed 
the IMF and World Bank to side-step these bylaws and make domestic law reform a 
condition of aid. 
The contractual power of international financial institutions to condition aid to domestic law 
reform has helped shape this particular vision of rule of law into a global constitutional 
structure.90 This not only sets the parameters for legal reforms that trump constitutional 
rights.  It has also paved the way for constitutional reforms that undermine those rights, not 
merely in the name of economic competitiveness but, paradoxically, in the name of the rights 
of the population.  In 2011, the Colombian constitution itself was modified by Legislative 
Act 3, which ‘gave constitutional recognition to fiscal sustainability, as a right of citizenship’, 
endowing the authorities with the duty to control public spending and public debt.91  This 
gave rise to new fiscal rules prohibiting any public spending that exceeds public income.92  
These reforms represent not simply the by-passing of constitutional rights but a paradoxical 
constitutionalisation of austerity in the name of rights that are simultaneously precluded. 
This same conception of law as neutral and technical has underpinned an increasingly 
undemocratic shift within many European states. Neoliberal reforms have intensified across 
Europe since the 2008 global financial crisis. This has involved increasing legal intervention 
into politics with the aim of eliminating democratic control over ‘the economy’ and forcing 
governments to implement austerity measures, subordinating governments to (often 
supranational) constitutional and legal rules that are portrayed as ‘necessary’ and beyond 
question.93  There were precursors to this, long before the crisis.  The treaties of the 1970s 
and ‘80s that anticipated a single market constituted the first steps toward making 
neoliberalism binding in law. This was reinforced by an activist judiciary that extended the 
power of European law over domestic law on the basis that economic competition was the 
key objective of the treaties.94 Article 14c of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty committed 
governments to avoiding ‘excessive deficits’, empowering the European Commission to 
monitor economies and to impose sanctions where a member state was deemed to have 
committed a ‘gross error’.  Through this, and a series of subsequent measures, austerity was 
enshrined within the legal framework of the EU.95 This ‘is not simply an incidental part of the 
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EU framework’.  It is ‘accorded supreme constitutional status’.96  
The EU has adopted the IMF model of conditioning aid to neoliberal economic reforms.  
When Greece was on the verge of default in 2010, the EU and IMF agreed a bailout package 
with strict conditions such as the ‘modernisation’ of the public sector and more ‘flexible’ and 
‘efficient’ labour markets.97  However, in the aftermath of the Greek Crisis, a series of stricter 
‘economic governance’ regulations were agreed.  These were aimed at getting governments 
to pre-emptively self-impose measures to ‘detect, prevent, and correct ‘problematic’ 
economic trends’ (which is to say ‘excessive’ budget deficits and ‘high’ unit labour costs), 
instead of retrospectively imposing austerity measures on crisis-hit countries in the style of 
the IMF-World Bank.98  Thus when Greece’s Syriza party was elected on an anti-austerity 
mandate in 2015, the President of the European Commission, Jean Claude Junker, could 
declare that Syriza would be unable to implement its programme because ‘there can be no 
democratic choice against the European treaties’.99 Juncker’s argument did not even invoke 
the idea of economic necessity: he could simply appeal to law, as if law itself were neutral 
and beyond the terrain of democratic contestation.  The violence of austerity is thereby 
normalised as necessary, merely technical, demanded by law.100  This is the case despite the 
fact that EU-level changes have involved a deliberate breach of EU law intended to give 
democratic oversight to national governments.101 
 
The UK already had a solid track record of using legal targets to ‘tie its own hands’ in this 
way. This began to be visible in 1997, with the election of New Labour and the imposition of 
fiscal rules that the government should maintain a balanced budget or budget surplus, while 
keeping debt at less than 40% of GDP.102 The self-imposition of austerity through law was 
entrenched in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. ‘Echoing the EU’s constitutionalisation of 
austerity, the 2010 Fiscal Responsibility Act imposed binding legal rules under which the 
Treasury had to ensure public sector borrowing decreased yearly.  In effect, the Labour 
government attempted to use law to create “external” compulsions on itself to implement 
austerity. Similar techniques were adopted through the subsequent Coalition government’s 
Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act, according to which any future budgets were 
to meet strict fiscal targets. The Act also established the Office for Budgetary Responsibility, 
charged with the task of ‘objectively, transparently and impartially’ analysing the Treasury’s 
policy for managing national debt and setting fiscal targets. ‘Thus, the Coalition – building 
on New Labour Policy – attempted to import the legal surveillance techniques of the IMF and 
EU into UK economic policy’.103 
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In much of the Global South, international financial institutions have become de facto 
legislators. However, the concept of law as a neutral means to economic competitiveness has 
also made corporations into natural counterparts of government in drafting new legislation. 
Housing campaigners have highlighted the role of the global real estate corporation, Savills, 
in ‘advising’ the British government on drawing up the 2016 Housing and Planning Act.104 
The Housing and Planning Act has been criticised for its ‘radical assault on the country’s 
remaining public housing stock’, socially cleansing poorer people from profitable areas, to 
the benefit of private equity firms and other global corporate landlords.105 The 2012 Health 
and Social Care Act was likewise written with extensive input from international 
management consultants McKinsey and Company. The Health and Social Care Act abolished 
the state’s duty to provide comprehensive healthcare and paved the way for reforms from 
which McKinsey and its clients stood to derive enormous commercial benefit.106 In 2012 and 
2013, McKinsey were one of a group of healthcare multinationals and other ‘industry 
leaders’ responsible for two World Economic Forum reports on the future of global 
healthcare. These proposals were quickly made into British government policy, bypassing 
parliamentary oversight.107  
 
In Colombia, rights set out in the constitution were overwritten by economically-mandated 
reforms of law. In Britain, legally-mandated austerity has been judged to violate human rights 
and equalities legislation, as well as human rights conventions ratified by the UK.108  Law has 
always been plural and contradictory. The clashes between liberal principles of human rights, 
freedom and equality and the capitalist order that demands inequality, coercion and 
premature death do not just reflect two different visions of humanity.  They also reflect two 
very distinct constellations of meaning around the ‘rule of law’.  Principles of equality and 
human rights emerge – broadly speaking - from the ethical tradition of ‘natural law’, 
developed by fifteenth and sixteenth century Spanish Jesuits.  It is here that we find the 
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origins of discourses of ‘the rights of man and citizen’ central to classical eighteenth century 
revolutionary declarations and anti-colonial struggles. This conception of law also underpins 
the ‘social’ theories of law developed by nineteenth century reformers and taken up by post-
war welfare states and developmental states. Within this broad tradition, property rights can 
be limited or curtailed in the name of justice and social solidarity. We should not romanticise 
such conceptualisations.  Jesuit formulations of natural law were a response to colonial 
scepticism about whether or not colonised peoples counted as human.  They served to shape 
legal justifications of colonial rule.109 ‘Social’ theories of law have not only underpinned 
democratic reform but also authoritarian forms of populism in the Global South.110 
Nevertheless, we should contrast social theories of law to another, quite distinct, 
understanding with an equally long history in modern legal thought. According to this second 
conceptualisation, property rights are at the heart of the law. State regulation to protect socio-
economic rights (through, for example, wealth redistribution or welfare provision) is said to 
undermine a ‘natural’, merely technical legal order, emptied of democratic politics and 
protected by courts as ‘neutral’ solvers of private conflicts arising in a free market.111 
 
This is not to say that the formal recognition of rights is mere sham.  Even in Colombia, the 
constitutional rights of indigenous and black populations to prior consultation over the use of 
their collective territories have been vital tools to social movements and lawyers opposing 
extractive projects.  The right to appeal the violation of a ‘fundamental right’ before a judge, 
meanwhile, has enabled trade unionists to be reinstated following unfair dismissal.112 When 
Coca-Cola worker Adolfo Múnera was shot dead in Barranquilla, he had just returned to the 
city following a successful appeal against his dismissal by his employer. The dismissal was 
deemed unlawful because threats related to his trade union work had forced him to flee. Law 
can be an important site of resistance, but we must be careful not to mythologise law in 
general as neutral, benign, or as any guarantee of responsible government.  Appeal to legal 
obligations sounds softer and more liberal than appeal to economic necessity, but it masks the 
differences between highly divergent notions of law. When governments appeal to legal 
necessity as the basis of policy, we should be suspicious in the extreme.  By declaring 
themselves subject to ‘the law’, governments may protect fundamental rights, but they may 





There is something deeply fascistic about this unfolding conceptualisation of law.  
Authoritarian state power is harnessed to the power of transnational capital, often 
accompanied by highly nationalistic and overtly racist ideologies that serve to justify 
coercive repression and mask spiralling inequality.  Yet what is remarkable is the extent to 
which this is accompanied by legal, democratic and social rhetoric.  For theorists of 
neoliberalism, such as Hayek and Von Mises, economic necessity left little room for social 
concerns.  The appeal to the ‘legal necessity’ of austerity, rather than simply ‘economic’ 
necessity marks a significant and particularly Orwellian shift.  It is not just that democratic 
forces are suppressed: the very meaning of democracy and citizenship are being reshaped in 
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accordance with authoritarian neoliberal constitutionalism.113 Democracy, Santos reminds us, 
is not done away with, even in highly repressive contexts such as Colombia. Rather, 
democracy is trivialized and hollowed-out, so as to make it almost impossible to threaten 
corporate power. 
 
Santos himself refers to this hollowing-out of democracy as ‘social fascism’.  The ‘social’ 
element of contemporary fascism seems, for Santos, to be limited to the maintenance of a 
formal liberal-democratic infrastructure in highly authoritarian political surroundings.  Yet 
the ‘social’ aspect of these fascistic tendencies warrants further consideration.  Across the 
world, the hollowing out of democracy and evisceration of social rights, has been 
accompanied by continued emphasis, not only upon the rule of law, but also upon social, 
democratic and humanitarian goals.  In contrast to the hard-line neoliberalism of the 1980s 
and early 1990s, social, democratic, humanistic discourse and vague ideas of the ‘rule of law’ 
are configured as an ethical rationale for doing whatever also – serendipitously - happens to 
be demanded by the criteria of efficiency and competitiveness. 
 
In the mid-1990s, criticism of the devastating consequences of structural adjustment 
generated a strategy change within the World Bank. Under the new rubric of ‘poverty 
reduction’, a greater role for state intervention was promoted, while ‘country ownership’ of 
the agenda, ‘good governance’, ‘local participation’ and ‘dialogue’ were to became 
buzzwords around which aid conditionality was structured. Neoliberalism gained a much-
touted ‘human face’, to the horror of traditional neoliberals at the IMF and US treasury.114 
Critics have pointed out that interventions under the label of ‘poverty reduction’ are, in 
reality, strategies designed to create the social underpinnings for productive labour and 
competitiveness in order to make targeted countries more hospitable to foreign direct 
investment. As Paul Cammack was quick to note when the World Bank changed tack, 
‘poverty reduction’ means ‘locking the poor into the market’, without any substantive change 
to the staples of neoliberal policy such as privatization or to the role of post-colonial states as 
producers of cheap commodities for the West. Civil society ‘participation’, meanwhile, has 
largely implied the co-optation of community organizations and NGOs into neoliberal 
agendas.115 
 
There are important, but rarely acknowledged shifts towards a softer, more pro-poor 
approach within the World Bank and the ‘social’ justifications for neoliberalism in Europe.  
Indeed, Ian Bruff suggests that Europe is a particularly useful place to begin to explore the 
authoritarian nature of neoliberalism, precisely because ‘more than anywhere else in the 
world, Europe’s self-image is that of a socially-aware, more generous and more inclusive 
form of capitalism than in other world regions’.116 In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, 
instead of the argument being made that the attachment to ‘social Europe’ must be dropped, 
austerity has been justified on the basis that ‘social’ institutions such as the welfare state can 
only survive if they are able to adapt to change.117 As Bruff underscores, ‘Europe has in 
reality been neoliberalizing through, not against, ‘social’ institutions of governance since the 
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1980s’. Long before the 2008 crisis, collective bargaining mechanisms had begun to be used 
to discipline labour rather than treating trade unions as equal partners (as they were 
considered under the post-World War Two rubric of social partnership between capital, 
labour and the state). Even before the 2008 crisis, European countries were witnessing 
welfare retrenchment and a shift from ‘welfare’ to ‘workfare’ (in accordance with a shift in 
emphasis from collective entitlement to a social safety net onto the individual responsibility 
to work).118 UK Prime Minister Tony Blair was a leading proponent of the idea that Europe’s 
social institutions needed to adapt to survive.119 His New Labour government did not only 
introduce the fiscal rules that paved the way to austerity after the 2008 crisis. New Labour 
also presided over numerous privatising reforms, such as those that ‘rapidly accelerated the 
fragmentation of the NHS and its permeation by private capital’.120 These reforms, which 
went with a huge mid-term funding increase, were rationalized on the basis of the need to 
‘save’ the NHS.121 
 
Convergence between the ‘social’ neoliberalism of the EU and the humanistic rhetoric of 
mainstream development discourse can be found in projects such as the ‘peace laboratories’, 
established at the turn of this century in Colombia. These are regional programmes for 
‘development and peace’, established as a joint initiative between the Colombian state and 
European Union, in association with the World Bank, transnational corporations and NGOs.  
They were designed to ‘explore, with the instruments appropriate to the Social Rule of Law, 
the paths which Colombian society must go down to reach peace and generate sustainable 
development’.122  
In Magdalena Medio, for example, the rhetoric of the peace laboratory is couched in terms of 
community ‘participation’ and ‘dialogue’, aimed at generating a culture of peace and 
‘integral rights’.123  In reality, what this has involved are initiatives such as the insertion of 
peasants into global markets through the ‘sustainable’ production of monocultures such as oil 
palm. The ‘participation’ advocated is ‘a participation on a supposedly equal footing with 
corporations’ through so-called ‘strategic alliances’. These involve 10-12- year contracts 
under which peasants must sell palm fruit to the company with the price is determined at the 
point of sale, meaning that peasants must bear the risks of falling prices. The company also 
extracts the cost of seeds and technical assistance from peasant participants in these 
alliances.124  Despite the reference to the Social Rule of Law, the ‘peace laboratories’ 
embody the ‘reverse of the social contract’ of which Santos speaks. ‘Strategic alliances’ 
between peasants and corporations are the quintessence of neoliberal contractualism, ‘a mere 
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appearance of a compromise constituted by conditions, as costly as they are inescapable, 
imposed without discussion on the weaker party’.125  Or as one peasant put it, in an interview 
with author and investigative journalist Gearóid Ó Loingsigh, they are like ‘an alliance 
between the fox and the chickens: in the end the fox will eat the chickens’.126  
Successive governments, the World Bank and EU talk about ‘peace and development’, as if 
development were the antidote to violence. Yet the model of development advocated in the 
name of ‘peace’ is the very model for which people were massacred in the first place. The 
paramilitary groups who took over entire regions like Magdalena Medio in close 
collaboration with the army were never mere armed mercenaries, but political organizations 
whose visions of ‘development’ overlapped with those of the government, World Bank, EU 
and international NGOs.127 Since the 1990s, forced displacement and massacres have been 
accompanied by a humanistic, developmentalist and conservationist discourse, propagated by 
UN bodies, the World Bank, transnational corporations and NGOs, as well as paramilitary 
and state organizations.128 
 
This is nowhere more visible than in current proposals for land restitution and ‘post-conflict’ 
development following the Colombian government’s peace deal with defeated FARC 
guerrillas. Most of Colombian national territory is now destined to be handed over to 
extractive industries in order to pay for ‘peace’, while displaced peasants have to agree to 
produce monocultures for export in order to get their land (more commonly) be relocated to 
‘unproductive’ land of no current use to capital. The very mechanisms put forward to 
promote ‘peace’ and advance ‘justice’ serve to consolidate what was achieved through state-
backed massacres and forced displacement.129 
 
Conclusion: ‘Ethical’ Murder 
 
We should not underestimate the significance of these social and legal rationalisations of 
dispossession. They represent a complete disavowal of the deadly consequences of 
capitalism, quite distinct to the reasoning of neoliberal theorists like Hayek and Von Mises. 
For the intellectual authors of neoliberalism, not even the right to exist can be recognised: if 
people cannot secure their own subsistence they must, from time to time, simply be allowed 
to die.  This is the best of all possible worlds, despite the suffering it engenders.  Such lines 
of normative reasoning persist, of course. Nevertheless, the brutality of corporate plunder is 
simultaneously obscured by labelling policy interventions in social and ethical terms. A 
virtual reality is conjured in which everyone participates on an equal footing and even 
corporations are driven by good will.  The tyranny of neoliberalism is disguised by persistent 
reference to the demands of law.  Meanwhile, social and democratic principles are 
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reconceptualised as the basis for entirely anti-social economic decisions insulated almost 
entirely from democratic oversight. 
 
Social fascism retains the tropes of social democratic discourse, but eviscerates the content of 
these principles so as to align them with the requirements of capitalism.  In social democracy 
(whether in post-war European welfare states or in accordance with the idea of a ‘social rule 
of law’ in Colombia), the rights of citizenship are established as limits – at least in theory - to 
what can be authorised on economic grounds. These are limited limits, of course, 
representing little more than a ‘modest ethical gap’ between economy and polity.130  They 
only offer protection from the brutality of economic force to the extent that regulatory 
mechanisms are in place to ensure rights are enforced.  Nevertheless, social fascism 
represents something quite different: an Orwellian world in which liberal values and 
principles are collapsed as far as possible into deadly economic processes. ‘Democracy’, 
‘poverty-reduction’, ‘social welfare’ and ‘rule of law’ and so on are part of an increasingly 
penetrative ethical newspeak used to disguise policies evidently intent on increasing the 
wealth of the rich at the expense of the lives of the poor, sealed off from democratic process 
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